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The Real Problem with Evolutionary 
Debunking Arguments 
	 ABSTRACT 
	  
	 There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in 	
	 metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of  our moral 
	 beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the 
	 realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of  our having moral 	
	 knowledge.  
	 In this paper I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings 
	 of  their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the 
	 other would have epistemic consequences for realism, but is false. If  I’m right, this 
	 undermines attempts to use evolutionary explanations to debunk 	belief  in other 	
	 domains too. 
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Introduction 
According to a common form of  argument, if  there is a plausible evolutionary 
backstory that would explain our moral beliefs, this would make trouble for moral 
realists in that it would commit them to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects 
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of  moral knowledge.  Arguments that take this form are known as evolutionary 1
debunking arguments (EDAs).  
In this paper I argue that evolutionary explanations of  our moral beliefs don’t in fact 
have any bearing on the epistemic status of  these beliefs. Perhaps there are other 
reasons to think that realism has trouble accounting for moral knowledge, but 
evolutionary considerations - I argue - are not among them. EDAs, I argue, exploit an 
equivocation between two distinct readings of  their central evolutionary claim. One is 
plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic 
consequences for realism, but is false. 
I begin by saying in more detail what realism is, what EDAs are, and identifying the 
ambiguity I take them to exploit. In §2-§3 I consider in detail a number of  different 
kinds of  EDA, and argue that each one rests on the same equivocation. In §4 I address 
objections. I also address a recent paper in the literature on EDAs that comes close to 
recognising the problem I set out here, and outline two important respects in which 
the problem I identify here is a good deal more severe.  2
 See Street 2006; Kahane 2011; Ruse & Wilson 1986; Joyce 2006a, 2006b; Greene 2008; 1
Lillehammer 2003; Levy 2006. For responses see Clarke-Doane 2012; Enoch 2010; 
FitzPatrick 2014; Graber 2012; Shafer-Landau 2012; Skarsaune 2011; Wielenberg 2010.
 Mogensen 2015. The arguments in the present paper were developed in ignorance of  2
Mogensen’s paper.
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Section 1 
1.1 Realism 
EDAs take as their target the metaethical position known as moral realism. By ‘moral 
realism’, most participants in the debate have in mind a view that comprises at least 
the following tenets: 
	 R1. Moral statements have truth-conditions  
	 R2. At least some moral statements are true 
	 R3. These truth-values are (relevantly)  independent of  the attitudes of  (even 3
	          idealised)  agents.  4 5
Some philosophers discussing EDAs have concentrated on more demanding 
conceptions of  realism, possibly because they think that the less demanding versions 
will have easier ways out of  the problems posed by EDAs. David Enoch, for example, 
takes the non-naturalist brand of  realism that he favours to be the version of  realism 
against which the debunkers have the best chance of  success.  The debunkers’ target 6
would then include a fourth tenet, that moral claims are not reducible to natural ones. 
My thesis here will be that evolutionary considerations don’t pose problems for any of  
these theories in the way that the debunkers have claimed. If  what I go on to argue in 
 Most realists who include a mind-independence clause don’t want to deny all kinds of  3
dependence of  normative facts on human attitudes. They will want to allow that the 
wrongness of  a sharp remark or an ill-judged joke can depend on the fact that it caused 
someone to feel hurt or embarrassed. For discussion of  this see Shafer Landau 2003: 15. See 
also Clarke-Doane 2012: 316-7.
 I’m following Shafer Landau 2012 in adding this qualification.4
 Street 2006: 110-111.5
 Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, pp. 151-184. See also Street 2006: 111-112; Graber 2012: 6
590.
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this paper is correct, then, even the most demanding variants of  realism face no 
particular problem from evolutionary considerations. Readers who are of  the view 
that some versions of  realism escape EDAs while others do not, should take my use of  
‘realism’ here to denote the version of  realism that they take to be the easiest target for 
the debunkers, and should take my claim to be that even this survives the debunkers’ 
attacks. 
1.2 EDAs 
EDAs all begin with the claim that our moral beliefs have been in some sense shaped 
by natural selection. Call this the Evolutionary Backstory (EB) Claim. Most debunkers 
take this shaping to happen indirectly: they aren’t claiming that the beliefs themselves 
are inherited from our ancestors; rather, they hold that these beliefs are the product of  
heritable dispositions.  As one influential debunker puts it, dispositions to experience 7
certain kinds of  behaviour as called for, such as looking after one’s children, or 
reciprocating kindness, underlie our moral beliefs.  These dispositions, the debunkers 8
claim, are the product of  natural selection: the reason these dispositions, and not 
others, got passed down is that these dispositions are fitness-enhancing. Creatures who 
have these dispositions are, ceteris paribus, more likely to survive and to reproduce than 
creatures who lack them. Since natural selection explains why we have these 
dispositions, and these dispositions underlie our moral beliefs, natural selection 
indirectly explains our moral beliefs. We have the moral beliefs we have because these 
are the ones that go with the fitness-enhancing dispositions. 
 See, for discussion of  this, Street 2006: 118-120.7
 See Street 2006:. 119; Shafer-Landau, 2012: 1.8
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But if  realism is true, there is good reason to think that the fitness-enhancingness of  
these beliefs did not depend in any way on their being true. For realists, true moral 
beliefs are those that faithfully represent mind-independent moral reality. But even if  
there are mind-independent moral facts, it looks implausible that the fitness-
enhancingness of  our moral beliefs would depend on how well they latch onto those 
facts. The realist should admit, it seems, that the fitness-enhancingness of  a moral 
belief  is an entirely separate issue from its accuracy. But add this to the EB claim, and 
it appears we have a backstory for how we came to have our moral beliefs in which - 
the realist has to admit - truth plays no role. 
The reasoning, then, is this: 
	 (1) EB Claim: Our moral beliefs have been shaped by natural selection 
	 (2) Natural selection is indifferent to the truth of  these beliefs  
	 (3) Our moral beliefs have been shaped by forces that are indifferent to their 
	      truth (from 1, 2)  9
Debunkers take (3) to be epistemically worrying for the moral realist in two broad 
kinds of  way: if  truth plays no role in our acquisition of  our moral beliefs, then: 
  
(i) It’s very unlikely that these beliefs are going to be true ones: for them to be true, it 
would take an enormous coincidence, and  
 See Kahane 2011 esp. p. 114, Street 2006, esp. pp. 125-134; Street 2008 esp. pp. 208-9; 9
Joyce 2006a: 222; Joyce 2006b, esp. pp. 135-6. See also Clarke-Doane 2012: 315-7; Shafer-
Landau 2012, esp. p. 3.  
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(ii) Even if, by some massive fluke, these beliefs were true, the flukiness of  our getting 
it right would surely stop these beliefs counting as knowledge (or indeed, having 
any other kinds of  epistemic virtues: justification, reliability, etc.).  
Moral realism, either way, is committed to an unattractive pessimism about the 
prospects of  moral knowledge. 
Although debunkers don’t tend to distinguish between (i) and (ii), they are in fact two 
distinct (albeit related) kinds of  worry for the moral realist. Call arguments of  the first 
kind Truth-Undermining Arguments, and arguments of  the second kind Warrant-
Undermining Arguments. I argue in what follows that both kinds of  argument are guilty of  
the same mistake. Warrant-undermining arguments (and less obviously, I will argue, 
truth-undermining arguments) rely on taking (1)-(3) to show that there is something 
epistemically wrong with our moral beliefs. But, I will argue, (1)-(3) in fact fail to show 
this. The root of  the problem is premise 1, the EB claim. Perhaps 2 is also 
questionable, but I accept 2 for argument’s sake.  The EB claim, I argue, is 10
ambiguous between two different readings, one of  which is plausible but epistemically 
irrelevant, the other of  which would potentially be epistemically relevant, but is 
implausible: 
The predicative reading of  the EB claim takes it to be predicating something of  
each individual. On this reading, it is saying that you, and I, and everybody else, have 
each individually been caused to accept the moral beliefs we accept by the forces of  
natural selection. 
 For critiques of  EDAs that challenge premise 2, see Enoch 2010, Wielenberg 2010.10
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The quantificational reading, on the other hand, takes the EB claim to be a very 
different kind of  claim, that the fact that the world contains many individuals who 
have these moral beliefs, and not many (if  any) who don’t, is explained by natural 
selection (because individuals who had those kinds of  beliefs generally had more 
offspring, leading to a situation where more and more individuals with these beliefs 
exist, and individuals without them make up a smaller and smaller proportion of  the 
population, eventually leading to a situation where all (or the vast majority) of  the 
individuals who exist have these beliefs). 
I call this the quantificational reading because what is being explained is a quantified 
claim. Quantifiers include not just ‘all’ and ‘some’, but also ‘many’ and ‘most’, so even 
if  you think that what’s being explained is not that all humans have these beliefs, but 
only that many or most humans do, it’s still a quantified claim that is being explained on 
this reading of  the EB claim. 
Ambiguities between predicative and quantificational readings are not unique to the 
EB claim. In fact, it’s plausible that any time we talk about explaining why members 
of  a group have certain traits, we get this kind of  ambiguity. Consider this case from 
Elliot Sober. Suppose all the children in a given classroom are able to read at Grade 
Three level. Now consider the question of  what explains this. This question is 
ambiguous in the following way. In one sense, pointing out that the ability to read at 
Grade Three level is a criterion for being admitted to that classroom would be an 
explanation of  the fact that all the children in that classroom can read at Grade Three 
level; any child who is unable to read at Grade Three level would not be admitted, 
and this is why all the children there can read at that level. In another sense, 
explanation of  the fact that all the children in the classroom are able to read at Grade 
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Three level would involve showing why each of  the individuals who are in fact in the 
classroom are able to read at Grade Three level. Suppose the children in the 
classroom are Katie, Alexander, Sally, and James. If  we can explain why Katie can 
read at Grade Three level, why Alexander can, and so on, then we have (in a different 
sense) an explanation of  why the children in that classroom can read at Grade Three 
level.  11
Note that first kind of  explanation doesn’t leave us any the wiser about how Katie, 
Alexander, and the others got to Grade Three level for their reading. It offers no 
causal story about how they came to have that ability. It is an explanation in the 
quantificational sense, of  explaining why the classroom contains only children who 
have a given trait, not in the predicative sense of  explaining why these particular 
children have this trait.  
Here’s another example: Sarah is an interior designer. All her clients are based in New 
York’s upper East side. In one sense, an explanation for why all her clients are based 
there is that she only advertises there. This is an explanation in the quantificational 
sense: it explains how her clientele came to be composed only of  people who live in 
the upper East side. But is is not an explanation in the predicative sense: it doesn’t say 
anything about why each of  these individuals who are in fact her clients are based 
there.  
Which reading of  (1) we accept determines where (1)-(3) gets us. In particular, 
different readings of  (3) are licensed depending on how (1) is taken. If  (1) is read in the 
 Sober 1984: 149.11
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predicative way, a predicative reading of  (3) would follow from (1) and (2), giving us 
the following argument: 
Predicative Reading of  (1)-(3) 
	 (1) Predicative EB Claim: you, and I, and everybody else, have each 	
	       individually been caused to accept the moral beliefs we accept by the forces 
	       of  natural selection. 
	 (2) Natural selection is indifferent to the truth of  these beliefs  
	 (3) Forces that are indifferent to moral truth have made it the case that I have 
	       these moral beliefs, and you do, and that other individuals do etc. 
If  (1) is read in the quantificational way, however, (3) would also need to be read 
quantificationally for the reasoning to be valid. The quantificational reading of  the 
argument would be as follows: 
Quantificational Reading of  (1)-(3) 
	 (1) Quantificational EB Claim: Natural selection has made it the case that 
	       individuals with these moral beliefs exist, rather than individuals with 	
	      different moral beliefs.  
	 (2) Natural selection is indifferent to the truth of  these beliefs  
	 (3) Forces that are indifferent to moral truth have made it the case that 	
	      individuals with these moral beliefs exist, rather than individuals with 	
	      different moral beliefs.  
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You can see how the predicative reading of  (3) would be potentially epistemically 
worrying for the moral realist. In general if  an individual’s belief  that P is a result of  
forces that are indifferent to whether P is true, then this is normally taken to be a good 
case for thinking that this belief  is not knowledge. The quantificational reading, on the 
other hand, does not obviously lead to epistemic worries. While the backstory of  how 
an individual came to believe that P is potentially relevant to the epistemic status of  her 
belief, it’s not clear that the backstory of  how the world came to contain individuals who 
believe that P would be relevant. 
Unfortunately for the debunker, however, it’s hard to see why we should take the 
predicative reading to be plausible. First, the debunker hasn’t given us any reason to 
think the predicative reading is true. What debunkers tend to say in support of  the EB 
claim is support for the quantificational reading. For example, Sharon Street says: ‘It is 
fairly obvious why, other things being equal, ancestors with these evaluative tendencies 
would have left more descendants than counterparts who, for example, viewed their 
survival as bad, their children’s lives as worthless, or the fact that someone has helped 
them as a reason to hurt that person in return’.  12
Second, claims about evolutionary backstories are, in general, quantificational claims. 
When we talk about a particular trait common to members of  a given species being 
the result of  natural selection, we are saying, roughly, that individuals who had that 
trait or tendencies towards it had more offspring than individuals who didn’t, 
resulting, ultimately, in a situation where individuals with that trait existed rather than 
individuals who lack this trait. When we say, for example, that the long-necked-ness of  
giraffes is the result of  natural selection, we are saying, roughly, that the ancestors of  
 Street 2008: 208. See also Ruse & Wilson 1986, esp. pp. 174-9; Joyce 2006b, esp. pp. 4, 13; 12
Joyce forthcoming, esp. p. 7; Levy 2006: 574.
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giraffes were such that, those among them who had slightly longer necks than the 
others tended to produce more offspring, and that this led to a situation where a 
greater and greater proportion of  the creatures that were born had long necks, which 
eventually led to the long-necked giraffes that exist now existing instead of  some other 
creatures with shorter necks. This is a claim about the process that led to there being 
individuals who had the trait in question, not a claim about the process that led to 
these individuals having this trait. 
Similarly, the EB claim is most naturally understood as a claim about the process that 
led to there being individuals who have the beliefs in question, not a claim about the 
process that led to these individuals coming to have these beliefs. 
Finally, the predicative reading of  EB doesn’t have prima facie plausibility on its side. 
What would it even be for the forces of  natural selection to push you, or me, or any 
other individual, towards certain beliefs? 
My thesis in what follows is that all major EDAs exploit the predicative-
quantificational ambiguity in their central claims. The predicative reading is required 
to generate epistemic worries about our moral beliefs, but only the quantificational 
reading is plausible. EDAs only sound convincing because they equivocate between 
these two readings. Until debunkers can provide either an argument for the 
predicative claim, or an argument from the quantificational claim to some epistemic 
problem with our moral beliefs, the realist faces no pressing objection from 
evolutionary considerations.  
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In Sections 2-3 I consider a range of  different EDAs, and argue that, at least if  their 
central reasoning is understood quantificationally, they can’t generate the bad 
consequences for realism that they claim to.  
In Section 4 I consider an argument that debunkers could use in support of  the 
predicative reading. I argue that even if  it succeeds, it won’t help the debunker. The 
argument hinges on whether some quantificational readings can also count as 
predicative. I argue that if  there are any such readings, they would also be 
epistemically inert, and so debunkers can’t use this argument to avoid the problem I 
pose here. Even if  the argument succeeds, then, it would not show that there are any 
readings of  EB that are both plausible and have epistemic consequences for the realist.  
One clarificatory point to emphasise about the scope of  my argument here: my task 
here is not to show that there are no tenable epistemic objections to moral realism. 
Rather, my claim is only that debunkers have not given us any reason to think that any 
tenable epistemic objections stem from the evolutionary backstory of  our moral 
beliefs. 
Section 2: Warrant-Undermining EDAs 
In this section I consider warrant-undermining EDAs: arguments that take (1)-(3) to 
show that there is something epistemically wrong with our moral beliefs, that would 
stop them from being knowledge, even if  they were true. I consider four epistemic 
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defects, and argue in each case that (1)-(3), understood in the quantificational sense, 
give us no reason to think that our moral beliefs have the defect in question.  
2.1 First potential defect: BAD CAUSAL ORIGIN 
Can the causal origins of  a belief  render it epistemically defective? Some debunkers 
argue that they can. Richard Joyce offers the following example in support of  this: 
	 Suppose there were a pill that makes you believe that Napoleon won Waterloo, and 
	 another one that makes you believe that he lost. Suppose that there were 	also an 	
	 antidote that can be taken for either pill. Now imagine that you are proceeding 	
	 through life happily believing that Napoleon lost Waterloo (as, indeed, you are), and 
	 then you discover that at some point in your past someone slipped you a ‘Napoleon 
	 lost Waterloo’ belief  pill. It is not a matter of  your learning of  the existence of  such 
	 pills and having no way of  knowing whether you have ever taken one; rather, we 	
	 imagine that you somehow discover beyond any shred of  doubt that your belief  is the 
	 product of  such a pill. Should this undermine your faith in your belief  that Napoleon 
	 lost Waterloo? Of  course it should.’  13
Matthew Bedke offers the following example: 
	 [Suppose an agent], Bea, […] is convinced that there is a goblin war raging all around 
	 her, where the goblins and their weapons are not composed of  physical matter and 
	 not made of  anything that can interact with the physical world. It really seems to Bea 
 Joyce 2006: 179.13
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	 that such a goblin war rages on, she believes it on that basis, and she waxes poetic 
	 about being in touch with such a fact. Suppose brain imaging provides some causal 
	 explanation for why it is that Bea has such bizarre seemings, and so why it is that Bea 
	 believes in the goblin war. A crucial part of  Bea’s brain is being impinged by a tumor, 
	 and similar pressures on this region in other patients have caused similar effects. This 
	 explanation proceeds without appealing to any goblin wars. Once Bea is informed of  
	 the imaging results so the she justifiably believes there is some full causal story for her 
	 seemings and beliefs, is Bea’s seeming enough to support her belief  that there is a 	
	 goblin war as described? No.  14
Debunkers like Joyce and Bedke argue that, if  realism is true, our moral beliefs are in 
a similar position to the beliefs in these examples because their evolutionary backstory 
has nothing to do with the truth of  these beliefs.  But are they right?  15
The analogy relies on the evolutionary claim being understood in the predicative way. 
In both the Napoleon pill case and the goblin war case, it is true of  the people 
involved that they only believe that P because of  factors that have nothing to do with 
P’s truth. If  the evolutionary claim is taken in the quantificational sense, however, the 
appearance of  similarity with these cases disappears. On this reading, the evolutionary 
claim says nothing about the causal process by which individuals formed their moral 
beliefs - it’s just a claim about the causal process that led to there being lots of  individuals 
who have the beliefs in question. The fact that this causal process was not guided by 
truth doesn’t look to be incompatible with the causal process that led each individual 
to his/her moral beliefs being an entirely epistemically respectable one.  
 Bedke 2009: 198.14
 See also Ruse 2006: 22-23; Street 2006: 13-14; Griffiths & Wilkins 2015: 106. Causal EDAs 15
are discussed in Shafer Landau 2012: 25-32. 
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Now, it is often remarked that the realist owes a positive account of  how it is that we 
are able to have any knowledge of  the mind-independent moral facts they postulate. 
And opponents of  realism may be right that it is not clear how they can meet this 
challenge, and that this is a significant problem. However, this is not the objection that 
EDAs are pushing. EDAs are saying that whatever other problems realists face, 
including perhaps the lack of  a convincing story about how we grasp moral facts, they 
also face further problems that stem from the fact that our moral beliefs have an 
evolutionary explanation. Debunkers are claiming, then, that however it is that realists 
think we do come to know moral facts, evolutionary considerations show that we 
aren’t doing it. 
If  I’m right, the quantificational reading of  (1)-(3) doesn’t succeed in showing this. 
Whatever kinds of  causal story of  belief  acquisition are epistemically respectable, (1)-
(3), understood quantificationally, doesn’t do anything to show that individual moral 
believers didn’t acquire their moral beliefs in one of  these ways.  
Three other potential defects: Counterfactual Profile 
Some EDAs argue that the evolutionary origin of  our moral beliefs implies that they 
have a kind of  counterfactual profile that stops them from being knowledge. One 
version of  this complaint is that our moral beliefs don’t vary across possible worlds 
with the moral facts, but rather with the facts about what is fitness-enhancing. Neil 
Levy puts the point this way: 
	 we have no reason to think that our moral responses track genuinely moral 
	 features of  the world. Instead, they are more likely to track fitness-relevant 	
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	 features of  our environment, which are not plausibly identified with moral 	
	 features'  16
There are two components to this tracking point:  
	 Sensitivity: Our moral beliefs aren’t sensitive to the moral facts, in the sense 
	 that we would 	give them up in situations where they aren’t true 
	  
	 Robustness: Our moral beliefs aren’t robust with respect to irrelevant facts, 
	 in the sense that we would continue to hold them in situations where they are 
	 still true - where all you vary is some irrelevant facts. 
A third complaint that is sometimes made is that had facts about natural selection 
been different, we would have had very different, rather outlandish, moral beliefs. I 
discuss these three complaints separately. 
One preliminary remark: these counterfactual requirements are most plausibly 
construed as placing restrictions only on what we do with our beliefs in nearby possible 
worlds. It would be implausible to require, in order for S to know that P, that it must 
be the case that every world in which P is false is one in which S doesn’t believe P, or 
that every world in which P is true is one in which S believes it, or that S not believe 
anything outlandish in any possible world. 
 Levy 2006: 574.16
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2.2 Second potential defect: LACK OF ROBUSTNESS  
Sometimes debunkers appear to take (1)-(3) to show that our moral beliefs aren’t held 
sufficiently robustly to count as knowledge. If  our moral beliefs hadn’t been fitness 
enhancing, so the argument goes, we would not have had them. By hypothesis, their 
fitness-enhancingness has nothing to do with their truth. So varying some feature of  
the beliefs that has nothing to do with their truth results in our no longer believing 
them. So these beliefs are not robust. 
Sharon Street appears to be making this claim here:  
	 [Since my normative judgements have] been shaped by causes such as my 	
	 upbringing, cultural background, and inherited psychological tendencies; it is 	
	 clear to me that had some or all of  these factors been different, I wouldn’t have made the same set 
	 of  normative judgments that I now make.  17
	  
The success of  this argument from robustness hinges on the following two questions: 
(i) is lack of  robustness an epistemic defect? And (ii) do (1)-(3) show that our moral 
beliefs lack robustness? 
Is lack of  robustness an epistemic defect? It’s not entirely clear that it is. I walk into a 
room, and see Maria, who is wearing a red jumper and is just about to leave. And on 
this basis I form the belief  that Maria is wearing a red jumper. If  I had walked in 
slightly later, I wouldn’t have seen her, and so I wouldn’t have had this belief. But 
 Street, Manuscript. p. 1. Emphasis mine.17
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nothing follows from this counterfactual about the epistemic status of  my belief  that 
Maria is wearing a red jumper. 
But let’s assume for argument’s sake that the notion of  robustness can be pinned down 
in a way that rules out that kind of  case, and makes it plausible that lack of  robustness 
is an epistemic defect. Do (1)-(3) show that our moral beliefs lack robustness? First, 
recall that if  lack of  robustness is a defect, it’s not that our beliefs all need to be 
maximally robust - that there’s no possible world where they’re true but we don’t believe 
them. The requirement only concerns nearby possible worlds. But here the possible 
world under consideration is not - by any stretch of  the imagination - a nearby one. 
But put this problem on hold. There is another problem: (1)-(3) doesn’t even show that 
individual moral believers would give up their moral beliefs beliefs when non-truth-
involving factors are varied. Again, the problem comes down to the predicative-
quantificational ambiguity: 
	 PREDICATIVE CLAIM: If  natural selection had gone differently, such that P 	
	 wasn’t	 fitness enhancing, the individuals who in fact believe P wouldn’t have 
	 believed that P. 
	 QUANTIFICATIONAL CLAIM: If  natural selection had gone differently, such 
	 that P wasn’t fitness enhancing, the human species wouldn’t believe that P, in 
	 the sense that different people would exist, people who had different evaluative 
	 tendencies, and didn’t believe that P. 
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Only the predicative claim equates to a lack of  robustness. If  the quantificational 
claim is true, it doesn’t bear on the robustness of  anybody’s belief  that P. The situation 
described isn’t one in which we give up our moral beliefs — it’s one in which we don’t exist.   
Not only does the quantificational claim fail to entail the lack of  robustness claim, it’s 
hard to see how it could pose any other epistemic problems. Why should the 
possibility of  creatures existing who don’t believe that P have any bearing on whether 
my belief  that P, or your belief  that P, is knowledge? While most of  us accept that 
whether an agent S has knowledge can depend on modal facts about what S herself  
might have believed in other circumstances, it is quite another thing to hold that 
modal facts involving other agents and their beliefs bear on whether S’s beliefs are 
knowledge. Perhaps it is even plausible that facts about what other actual agents in fact 
believe might bear on whether S’s beliefs are knowledge, but it is quite another thing 
to hold that not only actual agents, but also possible ones, are relevant.  
To summarise: (1)-(3), understood quantificationally, doesn’t tell us anything about the 
robustness of  our moral beliefs. Even if  lack of  counterfactual robustness is a problem, 
and even if  the world in which these beliefs weren’t fitness-enhancing, counted as a 
nearby one, we don’t have a problem here, since the situation described isn’t one in 
which we give up our moral beliefs — it’s one in which we don’t exist.  
2.3 Third potential defect: OUTLANDISH BELIEFS 
Some debunkers emphasise Charles Darwin’s claim that had evolutionary history 
gone differently, if, say, humans had evolved more similarly to bees, ‘[u]nmarried 
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females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and 
mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of  
interfering’.  18
Sharon Street argues, similarly, that had different evaluative tendencies been fitness-
enhancing (such as the tendency of  lions to kill offspring that aren’t their own, or the 
tendency of  social insects to treat the interests of  their group as more important than 
their own individual interests), ‘our system of  full-fledged, reflective evaluative 
judgments would have looked very different as well’.  19
To assess the argument from outlandish beliefs, we need to consider two questions: (i) 
would it constitute an epistemic defect with our actual moral beliefs if  we could have 
had outlandish moral beliefs? (ii) do (1)-(3) show that our moral beliefs have this 
defect? 
Let’s consider the first question first. It’s not entirely clear what the worry is supposed 
to be. But here is one attempt to reconstruct the thought that it would be bad for 
realists if  it turns out that individuals could have had outlandish moral beliefs. Realists 
 Darwin 1871: 122.18
 Street 2006: 120-121. See also Ruse & Wilson 1986: 186. Opponents of  the debunkers have 19
also largely taken this kind of  consideration seriously as a potential worry: David Copp 
explicitly takes it to be a desideratum that any successful response to EDAs ‘should support the 
idea that, even if  natural selection had led our moral psychology to be somewhat different from what it is, and 
even we had had somewhat different moral beliefs as a result, it is likely that our moral beliefs 
still would have tended to approximate to the truth.’ Otherwise, he says, ‘there would be a 
sense in which it would simply be a fortunate accident that there is a tendency for our moral 
beliefs to approximate to the truth.’ (See Copp 2008: 197-8.  Justin Clarke-Doane similarly 
assumes that defusing the argument that ‘natural selection could have led our moral 
psychology to be different’ would involve taking this possibility seriously, and showing that 
even in such a case we’d still have a general tendency to approximate to the truth, since our 
explanatorily basic moral beliefs about the goodness of  pleasure and the badness of  pain 
would remain the same. (Clarke-Doane 2012: 320).
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(at least those who think we have moral knowledge) would have to say that these 
outlandish moral beliefs are false. So perhaps the worry is that we could have had false 
beliefs, or that we could have had beliefs that are not only false, but false in a 
particularly ‘out-there’ way. And if  that’s true of  us, perhaps that casts doubt on our 
being reliable believers with respect to morality. 
Let’s suppose for argument’s sake that if  we were susceptible to outlandish moral 
beliefs in this way, it would render our actual moral beliefs epistemically defective. 
Does the reasoning in (1)-(3) show that our moral beliefs have this defect? Not if  (1)-(3) 
is understood in the quantificational sense. What follows from the quantificational 
reading of  (1)-(3) is only the claim that if  outlandish moral beliefs had been fitness-
enhancing, there would be creatures who had those beliefs. It doesn’t follow 
that we - in the sense of  you, and I, and everybody else - would have had those beliefs.  
Again, why should the possibility of  creatures existing who have very different beliefs 
from us pose any kind of  threat to the claim that the beliefs we have qualify as 
knowledge? Such creatures are still not us. Presumably everyone will allow that it is 
possible for there to be creatures alive who get things wrong - who have a lot of  false - 
even outlandishly false - beliefs with respect to a given domain. Even a domain for 
which realism is pretty uncontentious.  
Perhaps the argument is supposed to be an extension of  a plausible view in the 
epistemology of  disagreement, that we are rationally required to revise down our 
credence in P when we come across an epistemic peer who thinks that not-P. But if  
this is the reasoning, it rests on at least two controversial assumptions. First, it’s 
controversial to claim that not only are we rationally required to revise down our 
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credence in P when a sufficient number of  our epistemic peers think that not-P, but 
also that we are rationally required to do this any time it is even possible for there to have 
been a sufficient number of  epistemic peers who think that not-P. At the very least, 
such a claim would need further argument. 
Second, the argument relies on the claim that these possible believers are/would be 
our epistemic peers. But its not clear how this can be assumed without begging the 
question against the realist. Typical peer disagreement cases involve a one-off  
judgement, where the disagreement has few ramifications for the subjects’ other 
beliefs. This is no accident. When the disagreement is over a single proposition that is 
relatively isolated from their other beliefs, there’s no tension between the claim that 
two people disagree, and the claim that they are both relatively competent epistemic 
peers with respect to the subject matter of  the disputed beliefs. But the more extreme 
the disagreement, the harder it is to maintain both that (i) both parties are relatively 
competent with respect to the subject matter of  the disputed beliefs, and (ii) that they 
are epistemic peers. 
If  I believe that 20% of  our restaurant bill would be £15.23, and you believe it would 
be £14.89, that’s compatible with our both being pretty good at mental arithmetic. 
After all, even someone who is generally reliable can make a mistake. 
But if  I believe that murder is wrong, and that parents have a moral duty to be kind to 
their children, and I meet someone who thinks that mothers have a duty to kill their 
daughters, this doesn’t look compatible with our both being pretty good at discerning 
moral facts. If  this person turned out to be right, this wouldn’t be consistent with my 
by and large getting things right with respect to morality at all - I would be gravely in 
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error (and if  I am right, this person is gravely in error). We can’t both be pretty good 
at discerning moral facts; so the assumption that this person is my epistemic peer 
involves denying that I am pretty good at discerning moral facts. 
It’s no good saying that the debunker wants to challenge the realist’s claim that we 
have this ability. That is of  course true, but that wouldn’t entitle the debunker to rest 
her argument on the premise that we lack such an ability - rather, the point is to 
provide an argument that gives us a reason to think we lack the ability. The debunker is 
entitled to suspend judgment, of  course, but to hold that these creatures with 
outlandish moral beliefs are our epistemic peers is not consistent with suspending 
judgement on whether we have an ability to discern moral facts. We  can  only  take 
them to be our epistemic peers if we take ourselves to lack the ability to discern moral 
facts.  So unless the debunker already has some reason to think that we lack the ability 
to discern moral facts, this argument is not going to succeed in showing that our moral 
beliefs are unwarranted. 
To summarise, (1)-(3), understood quantificationally doesn’t show that you and I, etc. 
are susceptible to outlandish moral beliefs. It doesn’t get us the claim that you, and I, 
and other individuals, would have had outlandish moral beliefs if  they had been 
fitness-enhancing. Rather, it gets us the claim that individuals would have existed who 
had these outlandish moral beliefs. 
Moreover, it’s not clear how this latter claim could bear on the epistemic status of  my 
beliefs, or yours, or anybody else’s. Even if  the disagreement of  an epistemic peer 
should make one reduce one’s credence in a proposition, and even if  the disagreement 
of  possible epistemic peers, as well as actual ones, were relevant, we can’t take these 
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individuals to be our epistemic peers unless we already have some reason to think that 
we ourselves aren’t reliable believers with respect to morality. In which case the realist 
is already in exactly the kind of  trouble that EDAs are supposed to land her in. 
  
2.4 Fourth potential defect: LACK OF SENSITIVITY 
Some debunkers argue that (1)-(3) shows our moral beliefs to be counterfactually insensitive 
in the sense that we’d still have these beliefs even if  they weren’t true.  The underlying 20
reasoning appears to be as follows: we evolved to have these moral beliefs because they 
are fitness-enhancing. And so even if  they weren’t true, as long as they were still 
fitness-enhancing, we’d still have them.  21
Does (1)-(3) entail that our moral beliefs are insensitive? There is much discussion of  
this argument in the literature, and various objections have been made to it,  but 22
whether or not these objections are successful, the argument suffers from the same 
equivocation as the arguments discussed above. Read quantificationally, (1)-(3) doesn’t 
entail that individuals only have the moral beliefs they have because they are fitness-
enhancing; it entails only that people who have these moral beliefs, whatever their reasons 
for believing them in fact are, have tended to live longer and have more offspring, so that 
over time, more and more people exist who have them.  
 This kind of  argument is made by Joyce 2006: 183, Street 2006: 132, and Bedke 2009: 196. 20
It is discussed in Shafer-Landau 2012, Clarke-Doane 2012, and Wielenberg 2010.
 Some might argue that the realist has a quicker defence against the sensitivity worry: if  21
moral truths are necessary truths, then true moral beliefs will be vacuously sensitive - if  there’s 
no possible world in which they are false, there is no possible world in which we believe them 
falsely. However, for discussion of  why this may be too quick, see Clarke-Doane 2012, and 
Shafer-Landau 2012.
 See Shafer Landau 2012, Clarke-Doane 2012.22
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So (1)-(3), in the quantificational sense, does nothing to close off  the possibility that 
people who have these beliefs and the evolutionary advantages they bring, are such 
that they would give them up if  they were not true. Sure, such people wouldn’t have 
the evolutionary advantages in that counterfactual scenario, but the EB claim doesn’t 
entail that people have traits that would be fitness-enhancing in far-flung 
counterfactual scenarios. It says only that the moral beliefs people in fact have are in fact 
fitness-enhancing.  
Here’s the central issue: the quantificational reading of  the EB claim only tells us how 
the world came to contain individuals who have these beliefs. The beliefs are fitness-
enhancing: having them makes you more likely to survive and reproduce. And the 
dispositions that underlie these beliefs are heritable, so more and more people are 
born who have these dispositions. But all this is entirely compatible with the picture 
that moral realists want to endorse - that moral facts are mind-independent features of  
the world that we have an ability to discern. Beyond the dispositions being heritable 
and the beliefs being fitness-enhancing, the EB claim, in the quantificational sense, 
doesn’t say anything about what these dispositions that underlie our moral beliefs are. 
Many kinds of  disposition could play this role, and (1)-(3) read quantificationally, 
doesn’t do anything to narrow down which ones are plausible to ascribe to us. So it 
does nothing to rule out what the realist wants to say, which is that the disposition that 
plays this role is an ability to discern moral facts. Agreeing with the EB claim doesn’t 
force realists to give up their claim that the disposition in question is a genuine ability 
to discern moral facts.  
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Again, the realist’s claim might be implausible for other reasons. Claiming that we 
have an ability to discern mind-independent moral facts is not uncontroversial, and 
many objections have been raised to it - including that realists have a burden of  proof  
in showing that this picture is to be preferred to other plausible alternatives. But this is 
not the objection EDAs are making. EDAs claim that in addition to whatever other 
problems this realist picture faces, there is a particular problem that stems from the 
fact that our moral beliefs have been shaped by natural selection. But if  natural 
selection really does raise an additional epistemic problem for realism, debunkers need 
to show how natural selection rules out the realist’s favoured picture, and it’s not clear 
(at least from the sensitivity argument) that they can.  
The three counterfactual profile arguments just can’t get going if  we take the EB claim 
in the quantificational sense. The crux of  the problem is that the counterfactual profile 
requirements are requirements on what the individual whose beliefs you’re assessing 
does in certain possible worlds; not requirements on what kinds of  individuals certain 
possible worlds contain. For an individual’s belief  that P to be sensitive to P’s truth is a 
matter of  there not being any nearby possible worlds in which P is false  and that 
individual believes P. It’s not a matter of  there not being any nearby possible worlds in 
which P is false and the individuals in that world believe P. Similarly, for an individual’s belief  
that P to be robust with respect to irrelevant facts, is a matter of  there not being any 
nearby possible worlds in which P is true and that individual doesn’t believe P. It’s not 
a matter of  there not being any nearby worlds in which P is false and the individuals in 
that worlds believe P.  And finally, for an individual to not be susceptible to outlandish 
moral beliefs, is a matter of  there not being any nearby possible worlds in which that 
individual has outlandish moral beliefs. It’s not a matter of  there not being any nearby 
possible worlds that contain individuals with outlandish moral beliefs. 
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To summarise, I’ve discussed four kinds of  epistemic defect that debunkers have 
thought that our moral beliefs would have under realism, as a consequence of  (1)-(3). 
I’ve argued that (1)-(3), at least when understood quantificationally, don’t establish that 
our moral beliefs would have any of  these defects. Moreover, there’s reason to think 
that (1)-(3), read quantificationally, just can’t bear on the epistemic status of  our moral 
beliefs in any way. If  the EB claim is read in the quantificational sense, all it tells us is 
that these beliefs must be the product of  some kind of  heritable disposition(s). But this 
leaves open the very portion of  logical space that the realist will want to occupy: that 
the disposition in question is a genuine ability to discern moral facts. Unless the 
debunker can rule out this possibility, she will have failed to make any kind of  trouble 
for the realist. 
Section 3: Truth-Undermining Arguments 
The last section considered four different warrant-undermining EDAs - arguments 
that try to show that our moral beliefs couldn’t be knowledge even if  they were true. I 
turn now to EDAs that contest the claim that the moral beliefs people have are even 
true at all.  
The thrust of  the truth-undermining arguments is easiest to see when we consider 
moral believers third-personally. Then we can separate the question of  whether these 
beliefs are true, from the question of  whether the believers in question believe them.  
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	 1*: these creatures’ moral beliefs have been shaped by natural selection 
	 2*: natural selection is indifferent to the truth of  these beliefs  
	 3*: these creatures’ moral beliefs have been shaped by forces that are 	
	       indifferent to their truth (from 1, 2) 
One kind of  way to argue from 1*-3* to the claim that these creatures’ moral beliefs 
are unlikely to be true, would be to take 1*-3* to show that their moral beliefs are 
epistemically defective in one of  the ways discussed in Section 2. In general, learning 
that someone has formed a belief  in an epistemically defective way, very often gives 
you good reason to think that belief  is unlikely to be true. As Russ Shafer-Landau puts 
it: 
	 Suppose, for instance, that someone told you that there were exactly 	 	
	 5,422,000,000,000 fish in the world's oceans. You have no idea whether this number is 
	 even close. Then you discover that he landed on this figure by assuming that it was 
	 identical to the U.S. trade deficit for 2011. You now have all you need in order to 	
	 discredit his belief. Even though you are in no position to verify the correct number.  23
However, since these kinds of  truth-undermining arguments rely on the ability of  the 
EB claim to show that the beliefs it explains must be epistemically defective, they face 
the same problem as the warrant-undermining arguments: the quantificational 
reading of  EB just can’t generate the epistemic consequences, and the predicative 
reading just doesn’t look plausible. 
 Shafer-Landau (2012), p, 2.23
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But there is another kind of  truth-undermining EDA that doesn’t (or at least doesn’t 
explicitly) proceed via the claim that our moral beliefs are epistemically defective: 
Consider all the different moral beliefs these creatures could hold. Then consider that 
the beliefs they do hold are the ones favoured by natural selection. Add also the claim 
that natural selection is indifferent to whether the beliefs are true - whatever belief  
natural selection favours, natural selection’s favouring of  it has nothing to do with 
whether it is true. Since we know that the beliefs they have are favoured by natural 
selection, shouldn’t that reduce our credence in the beliefs being true?  24
This reasoning is faulty. This situation described is of  following kind: Suppose we are 
interested in whether some object O has a given property P. We know that of  all the 
different properties O could have had, P is one of  many possible ones. That is, there 
are many many possible scenarios in which O lacks P, and of  all the many possible 
scenarios, only a very small proportion are such that O has P. Then we learn that O 
has some other property, Q, which we know is entirely independent of  P.  
This new bit of  information lends no weight to the hypothesis that it also has P. But 
should it reduce our credence in O’s having P? No. There are two things to note. First, 
the prospects of  O having P, the property we’re interested in, already look bad, before Q 
is even mentioned. What makes them look bad is that all we know about the scenario 
we’re actually in, is that is is one of  many many possible scenarios, most of  which are 
such that O lacks P.  
 Street appears to be making this kind of  argument in Street 2006: 121-2.24
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Second, the discovery that O has Q doesn’t make the prospects for O’s having P any worse. It 
shouldn’t lower our credence that O has P. Since Q is entirely unrelated to P, it doesn’t 
help, but it also doesn’t make matters any worse. 
Here’s another situation of  the same kind: Suppose someone has picked a card at 
random from a normal pack of  cards, without showing you what it is. There are lots 
of  different possible cards they could have picked. Suppose you are interested in 
whether it is an ace. Suppose now it is revealed to you that it is a heart.  
A card’s being a heart doesn’t bear at all on whether it is an ace. It doesn’t make it 
more likely, and it doesn’t make it less likely. So the discovery that the card is a heart 
shouldn’t lower your credence that it’s an ace (even though it also shouldn’t raise it).  
Similarly, then, if  the fitness-enhancingness of  a moral belief  doesn’t bear on whether 
it’s true, the discovery that these creatures’ moral beliefs are fitness enhancing 
shouldn’t lower our credence that they are also true (even though it also shouldn’t raise 
it). 
The reason why the chances of  the moral beliefs being true look so low, is that the 
debunker is assuming that the only thing that is relevant to determining whether these 
creatures’ beliefs are true are evolutionary considerations. And sure, if  you start out 
with the stipulation that natural selection is the only thing we have to go on in judging 
whether these creatures’ moral beliefs are true or not, then it is going to look random 
whether they’ll be true. Again, however, two things are noteworthy:  
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First, it’s this stipulation that is making the prospects of  the beliefs being true look bad, 
and, crucially, the evolutionary considerations don’t make them any worse.  
Second, to assume that we’re in a relevantly similar position with respect to the 
question of  whether our own moral beliefs are true, is to beg the question against the 
realist. The realist thinks that with respect to the moral beliefs that humans in fact 
have, we are not in the position of  knowing nothing that is relevant to determining 
whether these beliefs are true. Rather, any moral realist is going to hold that we have a 
way of  discerning these mind-independent moral truths - not an infallible way, but a 
way that is good enough for us to count as often enough having moral knowledge, or 
at least justified or reliable moral beliefs.  
Now, perhaps moral realists are not right to hold this. Again, it is often objected that 
realists owe - and are unable to supply - a convincing positive story about how this 
happens. But again, EDAs purport to do something different from that kind of  
objection: they claim to show that whatever view realists hold about how it is that we 
discern moral truths, evolutionary considerations show that we can’t be doing that 
thing.  If  I’m right, this argument fails to establish this. Even if  moral knowledge is 
deeply implausible on the realist picture - as well it might be! - the claim that our 
moral beliefs were selected for doesn’t make it more implausible.  
Let’s take stock of  the argument so far. I have been arguing that EDAs get an 
undeserved appearance of  plausibility by equivocating between a predicative and a 
quantificational reading of  their central complaint. (1)-(3) are plausible only if  read 
quantificationally, but it is only by illegitimately shifting to the predicative reading that 
debunkers are able to trade on misleading analogies like the Napoleon pill case and 
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the goblin war case, or draw conclusions about what individuals would believe in 
counterfactual scenarios. The quantificational reading doesn’t support those analogies, 
nor does it tell us anything about the counterfactual profile of  individuals’ moral 
beliefs. Moreover, there’s reason to think that (1)-(3), read quantificationally, just can’t 
bear on the epistemic status of  our moral beliefs in any way. (1)-(3), understood 
quantificationally, fails to rule out the possibility that the disposition that underlies our 
moral beliefs is a genuine ability to discern moral facts.  
In the next section, I consider an objection to what I have argued so far, in the form of  
an argument for reading the EB claim predicatively.  
Section 4 - An Objection 
I argued in §1 that debunkers haven’t given any reason to accept the predicative 
reading of  the EB claim. But perhaps they can supply an argument for doing so. It is a 
live debate in the philosophy of  biology whether natural selection can explain why 
individuals have certain traits, as opposed to only explaining the frequency of  these 
traits in a population.  Karen Neander and others have argued that natural selection 25
can explain the traits of  individuals. If  they are right, then the EB claim could be true 
in the predicative sense, not just in the quantificational sense. 
 Elliot Sober argues that natural selection can only explain the frequency of  traits; Karen 25
Neander and others argue that it can also explain why individuals have certain traits. See 
Sober 1984 and 1995; Neander 1988 and 1995; Matthen 1999.
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I argue below, however, that this would not solve the problem.  Even Neander et al 
accept that evolutionary explanations are explanations in the quantificational sense. 
They just argue that they also qualify as explanations in the predicative sense, and that 
they do the latter precisely by doing the former: it is by explaining the frequency of  
traits that they get to play a role in explaining why individuals have these traits. But, as 
I shall now argue, the problems I identified in Section 2 apply to all quantificational 
readings of  EB, even if  they also qualify as predicative.  
This becomes clear when we look at the argument that Neander et al use. The 
argument begins with the claim that inheritance can explain the traits of  individuals: my 
green eyes are explained, in some sense, by the fact that both my parents have green 
eyes. The thought is that this opens the door to natural selection being able to play an 
explanatory role, too, for certain traits of  individuals. The fact that I have opposable 
thumbs is explained, in some sense, by the fact that my parents have them. But a fuller 
explanation would involve also explaining why they have opposable thumbs. Such an 
explanation could involve pointing out that their parents had opposable thumbs. And of  
course, we could keep going back a generation, to explain the opposable thumbs of  
each set of  ancestors. However, argues Neander: 
	 The correct explanation does not go on in this way ad infinitum.	 Somewhere back 
	 along the line (where our ancestry has long ago met and pleasurably mingled) there 
	 were occasional mutations or significant genetic recombinations. Here is the key point 
	 of  my argument: all (or virtually all) of  these alterations in the genetic code among 
	 our ancestors tended phenotypically toward opposable thumbness. (That is, they were 
	 genetic alterations which resulted in a more opposable thumb.) This is a remarkable 
	 fact in view of  the randomness of  these processes, and it requires explanation. Most 
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	 significantly, it is a fact about the frequency of  a genotypic and phenotypic trait in a population. 
	 […] It can only be explained by direct appeal to selection for individuals with 	
	 opposable thumbs.  26
What’s important to note is that this argument doesn’t deny that the explanation is a 
quantificational one - it just claims that it also counts as a predicative one. According to 
Neander et al, the way in which natural selection explains the moral beliefs of  
individuals is by explaining the frequency of  these beliefs in the population. The debate is over 
whether explaining the frequency of  a trait can count as in some sense explaining (or 
partially explaining) why individuals have those traits. It’s not a debate over whether 
natural selection can explain the traits of  individuals in some way other than by 
explaining the frequency of  these traits. All parties to this debate accept that the 
explanatory work natural selection can do of  traits (whether in the predicative or the 
quantificational sense) is done, at bottom, by explaining the frequency of  traits in a population.  
But the arguments I’ve given in Section 2 are arguments for thinking that explanations 
of  the frequency of  our moral beliefs can’t have any bearing on the epistemic status of  
these beliefs. And this remains the case whether or not such explanations count as also 
explaining the moral beliefs of  individuals. A brief  look at the different kinds of  EDAs again, 
confirms that the arguments of  Section 2 apply even if  Neander et al are right.  
Consider the worries about causal origin. Neander et al will agree that natural 
selection explains why certain moral beliefs are so prevalent among humans. But 
here’s the crucial point: whether or not that counts as an explanation, in some sense, 
of  why I have the moral beliefs I have, why you do, etc., it’s not an explanation in the 
same kind of  sense as the Napoleon pills or the brain tumour. So again the argument 
 Neander 1988: 425-6.26
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from causal origin can’t piggyback on these sorts of  cases; a separate argument would 
be required.  
Moreover, it’s hard to see how the kind of  backstory involved in the EB claim could 
show that our moral beliefs have an epistemically bad causal origin. Again, take 
whatever causal story of  belief  acquisition would be epistemically respectable; the 
claim that individuals acquired their moral beliefs that way - however implausible you 
think that would be for other reasons - isn’t made any more implausible by the fact that 
what led to there being so many individuals with these moral beliefs had nothing to do 
with their truth. 
Next consider the sensitivity worry. I argued that the EB claim does nothing to rule 
out the realist’s claim that the dispositions underlying our moral beliefs are genuine 
abilities to discern moral facts, so it doesn’t establish that our moral beliefs are 
insensitive to the moral facts. If  Neander et al are right, natural selection explains, in a 
sense, why I have a given fitness-enhancing disposition. But a disposition that is in fact 
fitness-enhancing, doesn’t have to be fitness-enhancing in all possible worlds - so there is no 
reason to think that the disposition that underlies my moral beliefs, and yours etc., is 
one that would produce these particular beliefs in all worlds where they are fitness-
enhancing, including worlds in which they were false. 
Finally, consider the robustness and outlandishness worries. Both are worries about 
what would happen in counterfactual situations where the fitness-enhancingness of  
beliefs is different. Vary the fitness-enhancingness of  an in-fact evolved trait, and you 
vary which creatures reproduce, and which creatures are born. So the situation in 
which different moral beliefs were fitness-enhancing, is one in which different 
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creatures exist, not a situation in which you, I, and other individuals who in fact exist, 
have different moral beliefs. And the situation in which the moral beliefs we in fact 
have are not fitness-enhancing, is also one in which different creatures exist, not one in 
which you, and I lack the moral beliefs that we in fact have. Whether, as Neander 
claims, natural selection can in some sense explain the traits of  individuals, doesn’t 
change any of  this, since Neander agrees that the way in which natural selection does 
this is by influencing which individuals survive and reproduce.  
Now, perhaps it will be objected that my arguments here assume the essentiality of  
ancestry: that it is a necessary truth that each individual has the ancestors she in fact 
has. But my arguments don’t in fact rely on this assumption. Essentiality of  ancestry 
would be one reason to think that the individuals in these counterfactual scenarios are 
not us. So it is true that denying the essentiality of  ancestry would remove one barrier 
to holding that they are us; but debunkers need far more than this. Debunkers need it 
to be the case that these individuals definitely are us. The problem is they haven’t given 
any reason to think that they would be.  
Perhaps, though, one might worry that if  ancestry is not essential, this frees up the 
possibility of  making the Neander-type argument in a way that makes the robustness 
and outlandishness worries look more persuasive. As Mohan Matthen puts it: ‘Why do 
I have an opposable thumb? Part of  the answer is: because of  natural selection, there 
were no other genes in the pool from which to make me’.   27
But then it looks like a short step from this to saying:  
 Matthen, pp. 149-50. 27
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	 (C1) if  the gene pool had been composed differently, I would not have had 	
	         opposable thumbs.  
After all, if  there were no opposable thumb genes in the pool, I would not have had 
opposable thumbs because there would have been no opposable thumb genes from 
which to make me.  
But if  C1 looks okay, wouldn’t it also be okay to say: 
	  
	 (C2) if  the gene pool had been differently constituted, I would not have the 
	         moral beliefs that I in fact have 
and: 
	 (C3) if  the gene pool had been differently constituted, I would have different 
	         moral beliefs? 
And C2 and C3 just amount to the robustness and outlandishness worries, 
respectively.  
This argument would not be successful. The problem is that counterfactuals like C1 
don’t follow straightforwardly from Matthen’s claim. If  there is a sense in which these 
counterfactuals are true, it’s this: hold fixed that I exist, and then consider what 
properties I would have, assuming I exist, in different kinds of  counterfactual scenario. 
What’s doing the work in Matthen’s original claim, and in C1-3 is the thought that in 
the relevant scenario, ‘there [would be] no other genes in the pool from which to make 
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me’. But this can only get us C1-3 if  we hold fixed that the scenario must be one in 
which I exist. A lack of  opposable thumb genes in the pool doesn’t guarantee that I 
exist without opposable thumbs - all it gets us is that if  I exist I don’t have opposable 
thumbs. But here’s the crucial point: 
	 (O1) if  outlandish moral beliefs had been fitness-enhancing, then if  I existed I 
	         would have outlandish moral beliefs 
is a very different claim from  
	 (O2) if  outlandish moral beliefs had been fitness-enhancing, then I would have 
	         outlandish moral beliefs.  
It’s one thing to claim that the epistemic respectability of  my moral beliefs depends on 
O2’s being false; it’s quite another to claim that it depends on O1’s being false. Since 
Matthen’s argument can only get us O1, it doesn’t give us any reason to worry about 
the epistemic status of  our moral beliefs, at least in terms of  the outlandishness worry. 
Similarly for the robustness worry. Matthen’s argument can’t get us: 
	 (R1) if  my actual moral beliefs hadn’t been fitness-enhancing, I wouldn’t have 
	        had them,  
but only the weaker claim: 
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	 (R2) if  my actual moral beliefs hadn’t been fitness-enhancing, then if  I existed I 
	         would lack these beliefs.  
Only R1 amounts to lack of  robustness.  
So even if  Matthen is right about natural selection’s ability to explain individuals’ 
traits, the way in which it does so doesn’t support the outlandishness worry about our 
moral beliefs, nor does it support the robustness worry. And unless debunkers can 
supply some reason for thinking that (O2) or (R2) would entail that my moral beliefs 
are epistemically defective, Matthen’s argument doesn’t give us a reading of  the EB 
claim that would bear on the epistemic status of  our moral  beliefs. 
In summary, whether or not Neander, Matthen et al succeed in showing that natural 
selection can explain the traits of  individuals, there does not appear to be any 
plausible reading of  the EB claim that would allow (1)-(3) to generate worries that our 
moral beliefs are epistemically defective. My claim, either way, is that explanations of  
how the world came to contain individuals with these moral beliefs, are not the kind 
of  explanations that can bear on the epistemic status of  these beliefs. And this is so 
whether or not such explanations also qualify as in some sense explaining why individuals 
have the beliefs. If  they do explain this, they don’t do so in any sense that would be 
epistemically relevant. So even if  Neander et al turned out to be right, this wouldn’t 
affect my arguments against EDAs. But although the spirit of  my claim would remain 
the same if  Neander’s argument were successful, the letter of  it would require one 
modification. The distinction across which EDAs equivocate would not be the 
distinction between predicative and quantificational readings of  the EB claim, but 
between quantificational and non-quantificational readings. The quantificational 
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reading would, as before, be the only reading of  EB that is plausibly true, while only a 
non-quantificational reading would plausibly generate epistemic consequences for our 
moral beliefs.  
There is one recent paper in the debate on EDAs that comes close to recognising the 
problem I have articulated here. In ‘Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a 
Mistake about Evolutionary Explanations?’, Andreas Mogensen objects to EDAs on 
similar grounds to those invoked here. If  what I’ve argued here is correct, however, 
Mogensen’s arguments don’t go far enough: EDAs face a problem that is more severe 
than the objection Mogensen raises, in at least two respects. 
First, Mogensen takes the problem with EDAs to be that they rest on controversial 
assumptions. He argues that EDAs ‘beg important questions in the philosophy of  
biology’ because they rely on Neander et al being right that natural selection can 
explain the traits of  individuals.  He thinks, as I do, that if  natural selection can’t 28
explain the traits of  individuals, EDAs won’t get off  the ground. But Mogensen 
doesn’t go far enough: he allows that if  Neander et al were right, EDAs would survive 
the objection. But if  what I have argued in this section is correct, EDAs are in trouble 
even if  Neander et al are right. 
Second, Mogensen’s argument relies on assuming the essentiality of  ancestry, at least 
for the individuals that in fact exist.  If  what I’ve argued above is correct, however, 29
EDAs have a problem even if  our ancestry is not essential to us. 
 Mogensen 2015: 1800.28
 Mogensen 2015: 1804-5.29
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Conclusion 
My target in this paper has been arguments that take the evolutionary backstory of  
our moral beliefs to debunk those beliefs (either in the sense of  showing them to be 
likely false, or epistemically defective in a way that would preclude their being 
knowledge even if  true). I’ve argued that the evolutionary backstories of  beliefs just 
can’t do this kind of  work. 
The reason they appear to do so, is that they can sound a bit like the sorts of  backstory 
claims that do have epistemic consequences. But once we appreciate what the 
evolutionary backstory of  our moral beliefs amounts to (namely, an explanation of  the 
prevalence of  certain moral beliefs, by explaining why individuals who had tendencies 
towards them reproduced more, leading to there being more and more individuals 
with these tendencies), it looks highly doubtful that this is the kind of  backstory that 
can bear on the epistemic status of  these beliefs. I argued that this is so even if  natural 
selection can explain the traits of  individuals, for even if  it can, the sense in which it 
would do so is not a sense that would be epistemically relevant.  
I want to stress again that my conclusions here are entirely compatible with taking 
seriously the problems that moral realism faces. None of  my arguments have relied on 
underestimating the challenge that realists face in explaining how we can have 
knowledge of  abstract, mind-independent moral facts.  However pessimistic we 30
 David Enoch discusses this challenge in Taking Morality Seriously, p. 158. Enoch also thinks 30
that EDAs are a species of  this kind of  challenge. I disagree, but that falls outside the scope of  
the present paper. If, by ‘EDA’s, Enoch means to refer to a kind of  argument that doesn’t 
especially have anything to do with evolution - in which evolutionary considerations don’t do 
any work - then I haven’t said anything here about EDAs in his sense. But, as I have argued, it 
is common to hold that evolutionary considerations do do work in undermining moral realism, 
and it is this view that has been my target here.
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should be about the prospects of  this challenge being met, debunkers are taking the 
evolutionary backstory behind our moral beliefs to be a source of  additional worries. 
My claim has been that however bleak the prospects of  moral knowledge look for the 
realist, the evolutionary backstory of  our moral beliefs adds no further woes.  
If  I am right, this will undermine attempts to use evolutionary backstories to debunk 
beliefs in other areas too. In normative ethics, some philosophers have taken 
evolutionary explanations to debunk deontological intuitions.  If  what I’ve argued 31
here is correct, these explanations just can’t do this debunking work. Equally, 
evolutionary explanations of  normative beliefs in other normative domains, such as 
aesthetics, will - if  what I’ve argued here is correct - be just as epistemically inert as the 
EB claim, and pose no greater threat to realism about these domains than the EB 
claim posed to moral realism.  Again, whatever problems these target views might 32
face - and these problems may be serious - considerations about the evolutionary 
backstories of  beliefs aren’t among them.  33
Cambridge University, UK 
 Greene 2008; Singer 2005.31
 Street 2006, for example, takes the evolutionary considerations she discusses to cause 32
problems for evaluative realism generally, not just moral realism. 
 I would like to thank Michael Blome-Tillmann, Paulina Sliwa, Natalja Deng, and 33
anonymous referees at Philosophical Quarterly for helpful comments. For discussion of  presented 
versions, I would like to thank audiences at New York University, and at the Moral Sciences 
Club and Serious Metaphysics Group, Cambridge University.
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